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We examine the e⁄ect of regime change on privatization using the 2004
election surprise in India. In that election, the pro-reform BJP was un-
expectedly defeated by a less reformist coalition. Government controlled
companies that were being studied for complete privatization by the BJP
dropped by 7.5 percent relative to private ￿rms. By contrast, government
controlled ￿rms that were not being considered for privatization, or ￿rms
that had already been fully privatized ￿rms, did not experience signi￿cant
drop relative to private ￿rms. Firms that the BJP had slated for de￿nite
future privatization experienced intermediate declines of approximately
3.5 percent. We interpret this as evidence consistent with investor belief
of policy irreversibility in privatization, where reforms may reach a ￿ point
of no return￿beyond which future regimes have di¢ culty reversing those
policies. Taking advantage of an ￿ intermediate￿event where policies were
expected to be more heavily in￿ uenced by the communist party, we still
￿nd evidence consistent with policy irreversibility. (JEL:Fill in)
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x￿ll in
1Over the past couple of decades, economists have shifted towards supporting
private over public ownership, motivated by a large body of the theoretical and
empirical work documenting the ine¢ ciencies stemming from state ownership
(see Shleifer, 1998, for a summary). Concomitant with this change in thinking,
governments around the world have privatized state assets to raise revenues,
and also presumably to generate improved economic performance (Megginson
and Netter, 2001). However, many assets slated for privatization remain in
government hands. Further, governments have retained control rights through
continued majority stakes, thereby obviating many of the advantages that are
meant to be derived from privatization (Gupta, 2005).
One signi￿cant barrier to privatization stems from the often volatile politics
in countries attempting to implement large-scale privatizations: While the party
in power may favor the sale of state assets, privatization is a long run process
which may, as in the case of India we study here, continue across di⁄erent
governing regimes with di⁄ering views on privatization. Since each new gov-
ernment may argue that they are not bound by the promises of earlier regimes,
investors may be concerned that the privatization process may be derailed with
each electoral cycle, which may be undermining to the attempts at sell-o⁄s in
the ￿rst place. This is a multi-party variant on the classic hold-up problem
faced by privatizing governments due to the temptation to expropriate the new
owners after the transfer of funds has taken place (Perotti, 1995). On the other
hand, policies, once committed to, may be di¢ cult to reverse for a number of
reasons. Perhaps most straightforwardly, there is inertia in policy - legisla-
tive checks and balances in a parliamentary democracy make policy reversals
di¢ cult, and vested interests may be mobilized to resist changes. Scholars of
political economy also provide a number of arguments based on government
credibility: Governments may not wish to completely undermine the policies
that had been put in place by a previous regime, since the new government
understands that it will not be in power forever, and hence may wish to sustain
a cooperative equilibrium with other parties (see, for example, Alesina, 1988
for a classic reference).1 Closely related is the argument that political parties
may put some value on the maintenance of the reputation of the legislature (as
distinct from the political party itself). Overall, there may thus be a point of no
return in policies, beyond which less reformist politicians or new governments
may not wish (or be able) to overturn a privatization-in-progress.
To what degree are commitments to privatize actually held to be credible by
investors, and at what point do public statements commit future governments
to adhere to privatization programs? Given the arguments on each side given
in the preceding paragraph, it is largely an empirical question. India provides
a particularly promising site for examining this question. It is a country with
a large population of ￿rms at varying stages of the privatization process, active
electoral competition, and where privatization is actively debated as a policy
1This set of issues have been in the public eye recently because of the recent debate in
the U.S. Senate over the use of the ￿ nuclear option￿ to over-ride the ￿llibuster of judicial
appointments. Many observers suggested that this would undermine the generally cooperative
relations between Democrats and Republicans.
2question. Further, the recent national election in India provides a useful event
to evaluate the e⁄ects of political shifts on the privatization process. More
speci￿cally, we study the role of electoral turnover as a potential shock to priva-
tization programs, by studying the change in value of partially privatized ￿rms
in response to the surprise victory of the Indian National Congress (INC) party
in India￿ s 2004 election. In contrast to the less-reformist INC, the incumbent
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had outlined and committed to an ambitious
program of economic liberalization. This included the complete privatization of
a number of publicly traded ￿rms where the government still held a controlling
stake. Because partially privatized ￿rms were at many stages of the process of
complete privatization when the election took place, ranging from ￿ under study￿
to already fully privatized, this event serves as a useful laboratory for analyz-
ing government commitments to privatize (and government commitment in a
democracy more generally).
Our results may be summarized as follows: First, we ￿nd that partially
privatized (government controlled) ￿rms decline by three to four percent relative
to private ￿rms over a four day window following the election. Further, there is
considerable heterogeneity in the returns of di⁄erent types of partially privatized
￿rms. Most strikingly, the largest relative declines are among the ￿rms that were
under study for potential complete privatization; these ￿rms decline by seven to
eight percent relative to private ￿rms (signi￿cant at the 0.1 percent level) over
the four-day window. By contrast, ￿rms already slated for future (complete)
privatization, which might have been expected to decline by more than other
partially privatized ￿rms if a larger privatization premium had already been
factored into prices, declined by only about 3.5 percent relative to private ￿rms;
this decline is signi￿cantly less than that experienced by the decline of ￿rms
only under consideration for complete privatization. Finally, already-privatized
companies do not experience signi￿cant relative declines, nor do ￿rms that the
prior government had not considered for privatization. We ￿nd this non-linear
pattern between likelihood of future privatization and returrns to be highly
robust to a range of speci￿cations.
We provide a theoretical framework for interpreting these results. Intu-
itively, given that neither fully privatized ￿rms nor never-to-be completely priva-
tized ￿rms did not su⁄er abnormal returns, investors did not expect an increase
in government interference in companies with government in￿ uence under the
INC (relative to private ￿rms). Hence, we may interpret the di⁄erence in the
abnormal returns of ￿rms merely under study for complete privatization and
those the BJP had committed to privatize as stemming largely from di⁄erent
changes in the probability of privatization. We interpret the greater nega-
tive returns of ￿ under study￿￿rms as evidence in favor of some limits to policy
reversals.
Additionally, we may take advantage of the following ￿ intermediate￿event
- in the two trading days after the INC election was realized, it was thought
that the INC￿ s policies would be heavily in￿ uenced by communist members
of a coalition government. In response to this intermediate event all ￿rms
with any government ownership as well as recently privatized ￿rms declined
3signi￿cantly relative to private ￿rms, suggesting that the market anticipated
disproportionate government interference in the activities of all of these ￿rms.
Interestingly, the declines experienced by both fully privatized and never-to-be
fully privatized ￿rms were virtually identical, suggesting comparable shifts in
expected government interference in both types of companies. Firms that were
under study for complete privatization dropped by more than ￿rms that had
been committed for complete divestment for this intermediate event as well.
Interpreting these results through the lens of our theoretical framework, this
once again suggests that even in the presence of a more radical policy agenda,
the change in the probability of privatization was lower for ￿rms that had already
been committed to be privatized.
We consider a number of alternative explanations based on relative incen-
tives to privatize particular companies for the INC relative to the BJP. Most
importantly, we consider whether our ￿ndings may result from a realignment of
political interests and the resultant need for the government to maintain control
of companies for political purposes (Dinc and Gupta, 2005). Interestingly, we
do ￿nd that political changes in a company￿ s state of incorporation is predictive
of market reaction to the election outcome. However, this is independent of
our main results, as we observe virtually identical returns from state electoral
shifts regardless of government ownership. Rather, we interpret these state po-
litical e⁄ects as likely re￿ ecting the value of political connections to the central
government. We also consider alternatives based on the labor intensity, prof-
itability, and leverage of di⁄erent types ￿rms, and similarly ￿nd that our results
are una⁄ected.
Overall, we interpret our ￿ndings as providing strongly suggestive evidence
that reformist governments may have the ability to put in place changes that
constrain future governments from going back on pre-committed reforms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section 1, we provide a
background description of the Indian election of May 2004. Section 2 describes
the data. In Section 3, we provide a brief model to aid with the interpretation
of our results, and present our empirical ￿ndings. Section 4 concludes.
1 Political Background
India o¢ cially announced that it was embarking on an economic liberalization
program in 1991, while under a government led by the Indian National Congress
(INC) party. Although a number of economic reforms were phased in over the
subsequent years, the government made very little headway in privatizing state
companies. By 1999, only approximately 2.5 billion dollars were generated in
revenues.
In 1999, a coalition government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
came to power with more ambitious plans for reform. Further, in their ￿ve
years in o¢ ce, the BJP was much more successful in actual implementation
of policies. Of particular importance for our study, the BJP accelerated the
disinvestment and privatization program, and invited bids for well-established
4public sector companies. In all, over 7.75 billion dollars were raised through
the sale of controlling stakes and partial divestments through share issue pri-
vatizations (SIPs) in the following ￿ve years. In each SIP, a fraction of the
company was sold to private investors through an equity issue on the Bom-
bay Stock Exchange (BSE), with the government retained a controlling stake in
each company. There was the expectation, however, that a number of these ￿rms
would ultimately be fully privatized. For instance, the BJP￿ s political manifesto
states, "...the government should progressively withdraw from involvement in
non-priority sectors... In general, it should reduce its role in manufacturing and
services business, where the private sector can serve the people better except
where it is required for strategic reasons, to prevent private sector monopo-
lies, run important utilities, or in exceptional circumstances." Further, while
performance improvements from these ￿ partial privatizations￿have been docu-
mented (Gupta, 2005), investors expected further improvements if and when
the government sold o⁄ its remaining holdings.2
In addition to the companies that had already been fully privatized by the
election of 2004, the BJP published a list of companies that were already slated
for full disinvestment in their following term, as well as a list of companies
that were ￿ under study￿for possible complete disinvestment. Hence, among
government-a¢ liated ￿rms, we will consider four classi￿cations: fully privatized;
slated for complete disinvestment; under study for complete disinvestment; and
partially privatized but not under consideration for full disinvestment.
1.1 Election Surprise of 2004
In its political manifesto, the BJP emphasized that the government should focus
on core areas such as national security, macro-economic management, infrastruc-
ture development (both physical and social) and maintenance of law and order.
Importantly, the party emphasized that the government should withdraw from
manufacturing and services business, except in certain strategic cases (BJP￿ s
political manifesto, 2004). This, along with frequent mention of the budget
de￿cit, signaled to the market that a future BJP government would continue to
implement its large-scale privatization program. In fact, the BJP sold o⁄stakes
in six companies in the two months prior to the election to beat its ￿scal de￿cit
target.
By contrast, the INC platform stressed social change and employment op-
portunities for the poor. It mentioned strengthening the private sector through
new management, and selective disinvestments. Further, it was extremely un-
likely that the INC would be able to form a government without the support
of the communist parties. Since privatization would inevitably lead to some
labor retrenchment, the market interpreted the INC platform as largely anti-
privatization and anti-reform (The Economic Times, on April 28, 2004 noted,
2For example, the Economic Times on March 10, 2004 quoted a major rating agency chief
economist saying, "...privatisation is extremely desirable from the point of view of increasing
e¢ ciency of resource use..."
5"It seems very unlikely that ... a Congress government dependent on support
from the Left, can introduce legislation to push through with privatisation..." ).
Immediately preceding the 2004 elections, the BJP was overwhelming fa-
vored to return to power, as re￿ ected in pre-election opinion polls, indicating
that the INC was likely to su⁄er its worst-ever defeat in election history . The
elections were held in various states on di⁄erent days beginning April 20 to May
10. Even exit polls taken after the elections just two days before the results were
declared said that BJP was expected to win. For example, Hindu BusinessLine
wrote, on May 11, 2004, "Exit polls conducted by TV channels predict that the
BJP-led NDA is expected to garner 245-265 seats, while Congress and its allies
would bag 190-210 seats."
The election results were declared on May 13. Vote counts came in after
equity markets closed, and it became clear overnight that the INC had regis-
tered a convincing victory, and would likely head a new coalition government.
The BSE index reacted to the news by falling six percent the following day.
This re￿ ected both concerns about the economic policies of the INC, as well as
fears that in order to form a government, the INC would need the support of
the Indian communist party CPI-M and allies, which had won 59 seats, their
highest-ever. On the evening of May 14, the communist allies (the Left Front)
decided that scrapping of the disinvestment minstry was to be a precondition
for the CPI-M to support a INC-led government. The CPI-M General Secre-
tary, Mr Harkishen Singh Surjeet, said, "We cannot a⁄ord it (the disinvestment
programme followed by the NDA). We oppose disinvestment of pro￿t-making
PSUs" and generally implied that economic reforms would be put on hold. The
BSE went into a tailspin, falling an additional eleven percent on May 17 (mar-
kets were closed for the weekend on May 15 and 16) despite senior members of
INC responding with reassuring statements on future reforms.
The market￿ s concern over the CPI-M￿ s in￿ uence in the new coalition were
put to rest in the following days: After senior members of INC reassured the
markets on future reforms and the relatively reformist Manmohan Singh was
announced as Prime Minister on May 18, the market recovered by nine per cent
over the next two days. The timeline for the post-election sequence of events is
listed in Table 1.
[Table 1 here]
We thus have two shocks to the political regime ￿ May 14 represents a
relatively extreme shift to policies that they market felt, with some probability,
would be dominated by CPI-M ideology. Taking the longer period, May 14
￿ May 19, the market￿ s reaction re￿ ects investor response to a less extreme
political shift, i.e., a shift from BJP reforms to INC reforms.3
3This market￿ s feelings toward Singh￿ s leadership is summarized by Uday Kotak, managing
director of Kotak Mahindra Bank (the Indian partner of Goldman Sachs), who commented
that "[Singh] is a very acceptable face to the markets as well as to most political parties."
61.2 E⁄ect on (partially) privatized ￿rms
As emphasized above, the three parties (BJP, INC, CPI) all had substantively
di⁄ering views on economic reforms, and privatization was one of the central
points of contention. Potential di⁄erences in the treatment of partially and
completely privatized ￿rms includes both a shift in the probability of privatiza-
tion as well as potential changes in the extent of government interference that
may also impact ￿rm value. While there was no mention by any of the three
parties of actual reversals of already-privatized companies, governments obvi-
ously have many instruments through which corporate pro￿ts may be a⁄ected,
and their interest and willingness to do so is likely to be greater among ￿rms
with prior government ownership.4 In the empirical section, we will estimate
reduced forms of the e⁄ects of the two political regime shifts described above.
However, to aid in our interpretation of these results, it will be useful to put
some structure on market valuations. Speci￿cally, we will try to distinguish
between changes in valuation caused by di⁄erences in the probability of privati-
zation of di⁄erent parties and changes in valuation caused by di⁄erences in the
extent of interference by di⁄erent parties.
As suggested by our description of the privatization process above, we will
consider the e⁄ect on market valuation of four di⁄erent types of ￿rms: already
privatized (a); slated for disinvestment (d); under study for disinvestment (u);
and not considered for disinvestment (n). Note that, when we use the term
privatization below, we will always be referring to the change from partial to
complete privatization. Let the market valuation of a company of type x 2










i is the probability of privatization for a type of ￿rm x under regime
i, V
p
i is the value if the ￿rm is (fully) privatized, and V
g
i is the value if the
government chooses to retain a controlling share. That is, ￿rm value is the
average of privatized and non-privatized valuations, weighted by the probability
of privatization. We omit ￿rm subscripts for ease of exposition. Then the
change in valuation triggered by a regime shift from BJP to INC (exactly



















As this expression makes clear, there are many simultaneous changes in valua-
tion that occur with the regime change, and it is not immediately obvious how
one may identify the various components. However, we are aided by the fact
4For example, there were fears among recently divested oil companies immediately after
the election that the oil pricing mechanism that the government had recently made ￿exible
would be reversed.
7that companies in di⁄erent stages of the privatization process will have extreme
values of q that will simplify this expression. In particular, we assume that
there was no risk of renationalization under any regime. This assumption is
very much in line with the Indian government￿ s relations with the private sector
over the past few decades: Since the nationalization of Air India in 1953, the
only other major nationalizations have been the banking and insurance indus-
try nationalizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These sectors have since
been reopened to the private sector, and no media mentions have been made in
recent years of any renationalizations. If this is the case, then for ￿rms that
had already been completely privatized we may set qa
BJP = qa
INC = 1, so that







Similarly, we will assume that if a company is not under consideration for
full privatization by the BJP, the most reformist regime, then it is unlikely to
be privatized by any party, i.e., qn
BJP = qn







Rearranging (2), we may obtain a general expression for market reaction:
￿V x











INC;BJP ￿ ￿V n
INC;BJP)
We will be primarily interested in comparing the two intermediate ￿rm types
d and u, and in particular what we may infer about di⁄erential changes in
probabilities of privatization from market reaction to political regime changes.

















where A is given by:
A =
￿V a




BJP ￿ V n
BJP
(8)
This will be useful if we may put some structure on A. In particular, our
estimation below will generate estimates of ￿V a
INC;BJP and ￿V n
INC;BJP, by
looking at the change in market valuation of a and n type ￿rms.
82 Data
The data required for our empirical tests include (a) stock prices (b) privati-
zation information for the government controlled companies (c) company-level
controls.
Our sample is the set of BSE500 stocks, traded on the Bombay Stock Ex-
change in Mumbai. We obtain daily closing price data for each company from
Datastream. The main dependent variable in what follows is the returns (i.e.
daily closing price changes) for each company. We de￿ne election results day,
May 13, as t = 0 and calculate returns over the subsequent trading days. In















t is the closing price of ￿rm f on date t. These returns include the
market response to the election results combined with the subsequent comments
by the communist leadership. We similarly de￿ne R
f
4 as the returns over the
period May 14 - May 19.5 These returns further incorporate the stock market￿ s
reaction to the pacifying responses by INC leaders and the announcement of
Manmohan Singh as prime minister.
We use ownership data from the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy
(CMIE) database to classify companies as having government ownership (CMIE
has ￿ve ownership classi￿cations, including: Domestic Group; Domestic non-
Group; Foreign Group; Foreign non-Group; and Government). For ￿rms classi-
￿ed as government-owned, we obtained data on the Indian privatization process
and the stage of privatization from the Department of Disinvestment, Ministry
of Finance (India) website (www.divest.nic.in). Fully privatized companies, or
companies being considered for full privatization, were classi￿ed on the website
as one of "under study", "under disinvestment", or "disinvested." We generate
a set of indicator variables that re￿ ect these classi￿cations: UNDERSTUDY ;
DIV EST; and PRIV ATIZED respectively; ￿rms that were not present on
the list were classi￿ed as NEV ER. These indicator variables map to the ￿rm
types (a, d, u, n) discussed the previous section. Unfortunately, within a few
months of the election, this information was removed from the website.
Data on ￿rm characteristics were also obtained from the CMIE database.
These include size characteristics (sales), labor expenses, industry (matched to
2-digit SIC codes), and the state of a company￿ s headquarters. These variables
are used as controls and to check robustness.
Finally, for data on Indian elections and political parties running various
state governments, we rely primarily on the Election Commission of India web-
site (www.eci.gov.in). Further information on political alliances was derived
from www.indian-elections.com. We will provide further information on our use
of this geographic data when we describe our tests on regional political in￿ uence.
5The results are unchanged if we use risk adjusted returns
9The distribution of ￿rms according to stage of privatization is listed in Table
2A; in Table 2B we report data on for each of our variables, both for the full
sample and disaggregated according to stage of privatization.
[Table 2 here]
3 Results
3.1 Reaction to the INC Regime (4 day window)
Before proceeding to regression analyses, we show the basic patterns in the
data without conditioning on such characteristics as industry and size. Figure
1 shows the median cumulative returns of our four types of ￿rms relative to the
BSE200 index during May 14 - May 19. Looking at cumulative returns over
the entire post-election event, we see that all government-a¢ liated companies
declined relative to the BSE200. However, there is considerable heterogeneity
in the extent of decline. Most strikingly, median cumulative returns for ￿rms
that were under study by the BJP for privatization declined by 6 percent rel-
ative to the market, while already privatized and never-to-be privatized ￿rms￿
returns were indistinguishable from the broader market index. An intermediate
decline was seen by ￿rms already slated for privatization. Turning to cumu-
lative returns through to May 17, the midpoint of the post-election period, we
￿nd that the median returns of all government-a¢ liated ￿rms are below that
of the BSE200. That is, the market perceived that a CPI-in￿ uenced economic
agenda would adversely impact even ￿rms that had already been completely pri-
vatized (relative to the rest of the market). Additionally, the negative impact
of the CPI leader￿ s comments on ￿rms that were not even being considered for
privatization is large, relative to other government-a¢ liated ￿rms. Based on
our assumption that these ￿rms did not have any probability of complete priva-
tization factored into pre-election valuations, this suggests that the market was
concerned about greater interference in the running of government controlled
￿rms if the CPI were to in￿ uence government policy.
[Figure 1]
Turning now to regression analysis of returns, we present ￿rst a set of results
on cumulative returns for the entire post-election period, May 14-19. Our
baseline speci￿cation is given by:
RINC
f = ￿ + ￿1PRIV ATIZEDf + ￿2DIV ESTf
(10)
+￿3UNDERSTUDYf + ￿4NEV ERf + "f
10f indexes the ￿rm and "f is an i:i:d: error term. As explained in the data
section, RINC
f is the May 14-19 cumulative returns, and the remaining variables
are indicator variables denoting the type of ￿rm. The omitted category is for
￿rms that never had government ownership, so that the coe¢ cients on the four
indicator variables re￿ ect performance relative to private ￿rms. The results of
this regression are in the ￿rst column of Table 3.
[Table 3]
While returns relative to private ￿rms are negative and signi￿cant for all but
PRIV ATIZED ￿rms, the decline is most pronounced for UNDERSTUDY
￿rms, with a decline of 8:3 percent relative to private ￿rms. By comparison,
DIV EST and NEV ER ￿rms declined by 4:3 and 2:2 percent respectively.
When we control for industry e⁄ects in column (2), we ￿nd that the coe¢ cient
on NEV ER is no longer signi￿cant at conventional levels. In column (3),
we add log(SALES) as a control and ￿nd the results unchanged. Finally, we
control for geographic heterogeneity by including state ￿xed e⁄ects in column
(4), and ￿nd that our results are unchanged. We may summarize our ￿rst main
result as follows:
Result 1 In the post-election period May 14-19, NEV ER, and PRIV ATIZED
￿rms experience declines that were statistically indistinguishable from the
returns experienced by private ￿rms. UNDERSTUDY ￿rms experienced
declines of approximately eight percent relative to private ￿rms, signi￿cant
at the 0.1 percent level. DIV EST ￿rms experienced intermediate declines
of approximately 3.5 percent. The decline in UNDERSTUDY ￿rms was
also signi￿cantly di⁄erent (at least at the ten percent level in all speci￿ca-
tions) from the declines experienced by DIV EST ￿rms.
The interpretation of these results is aided by reference to Section 2 above.
First, we interpret the coe¢ cient on PRIV ATIZED to re￿ ect the expected






BJP. This is precisely estimated as zero (standard error of approxi-
mately 0:02), relative to private ￿rms, in all speci￿cations. Similarly, assuming
that the probability of full privatization was close to zero for all NEV ER = 1






BJP) relative to private ￿rms, and hence the
likely change in government interference in government controlled ￿rms under
the INC. In speci￿cations with controls, this coe¢ cient is insigni￿cantly dif-
ferent from zero, suggesting that the market anticipated a minimal shift in
government interference in the companies it controlled under the INC, relative
to the BJP (beyond industry-wide shifts in government policy which are ab-
sorbed by the industry e⁄ects). Comparing market reaction for DIV EST and
UNDERSTUDY ￿rms, we ￿nd that the coe¢ cient on UNDERSTUDY is
signi￿cantly more negative than the coe¢ cient on DIV EST. Di⁄erencing (7)
for the two types of ￿rms, and utilizing the fact that ￿V a
INC;BJP ￿￿V n
INC;BJP
11(and hence A) is very close to zero, we may estimate the di⁄erential e⁄ect on













Since the di⁄erence ￿V d
INC;BJP ￿￿V u
INC;BJP is negative (signi￿cant at least
at the ten percent level in all speci￿cations), and the denominator is clearly pos-
itive, this suggests that the market expected a greater change in the probability
of privatization of UNDERSTUDY ￿rms, relative to DIV EST ￿rms.
There are two primary interpretations of this result. First, the political
economy explanation that we outline in the introduction posits that the pri-
vatizations that the BJP government pre-committed to (i.e., DIV EST ￿rms)
would be di¢ cult for a subsequent regime to reverse relative to those that it
had not already committed to privatize (i.e., UNDERSTUDY ￿rms). We
refer to this as the ￿ Irreversibility￿explanation. Alternatively, it may be that
the ￿rms to be fully divested earlier are those that would create the greatest
bene￿t to the government, regardless of the party in power. If this were the
case, then the ￿ marginal￿privatization cases that were only at the stage of being
studied for possible privatization would be most adversely a⁄ected by a shift to
a less privatization-friendly government. We refer to this below as the ￿ Ordered
Privatization￿explanation.
While we cannot de￿nitively ruled out either explanation, we may provide
a circumstantial test for the latter. Prior work suggests that governments may
be averse to privatizing some types of politically strategic ￿rms. In particu-
lar, Boycko et al, (1996) focus on excess employment in government ￿rms, as
these companies are used to achieve the political objective of increased employ-
ment. In our context, the Indian government will be better able to control the
wage bill for ￿rms where it maintains a controlling stake. Hence, it may be
politically more costly for the government (BJP or INC) to lose control over
a ￿rm with more potential to cut costs by shedding labor. DeWenter and
Malatesta (2001) observe that, in addition to concerns over employment, gov-
ernments avoid privatizing ￿rms that are unpro￿table or heavily laiden with
debt. Hence, we investigate whether there are systematic di⁄erences between
DIV EST and UNDERSTUDY ￿rms in these characteristics. We de￿ne the
variable WAGE_RATE to be the ratio of a ￿rm￿ s wage bill to total sales; as
measures of pro￿tability and leverage we use PBIT=Assets and Debt=Equity.
The summary statistics in Table 2 show that for pro￿tability there is virtually
no di⁄erence between DIV EST and UNDERSTUDY ￿rms, though there are
many ￿rms for which pro￿t data are unavailable. For leverage, we ￿nd that
DIV EST ￿rms actually have higher debt ratios than UNDERSTUDY ￿rms.
The only characteristic that is consistent with the Ordered Privatization hy-
pothesis is WAGE_RATE: This variable does indeed appear to be correlated
with the decision to privatize: the mean of WAGE_RATE is 0:067 and 0:139
for DIV EST and UNDERSTUDY ￿rms respectively. This di⁄erence is sig-
ni￿cant at the ￿ve percent level. Further, NEV ER ￿rms have a wage ratio of
120.14 that is much closer to that of UNDERSTUDY ￿rms. We therefore in-
clude WAGE_RATE as a control variable in speci￿cation (10). This appears
in column (5) of Table 3: the coe¢ cient on WAGE_RATE is not signi￿cant,
and more importantly, the coe¢ cients on our privatization variables are unaf-
fected. Thus, while there is some evidence that labor intensive ￿rms were being
held back from privatization, this does not seem to be the primary explanation
for the di⁄erential market reaction that we study here. Overall, our results
here provides tentative evidence that runs counter to the Ordered Privatization
explanation. We recognize that this by no means conclusive, as it may be that
the DIV EST versus UNDERSTUDY classi￿cation is a more precise proxy
for the preferred ordering of privatization for any government, but our test does
provide compelling circumstancial evidence to the contrary.
A second concern is that the ordering of privatizations may be a function
of political interests. Indeed, in the case of India speci￿cally, Dinc and Gupta
(2005) provide evidence that government owned ￿rms based in states where
the government holds a majority are less likely to be privatized. It may be,
therefore, that the BJP held back ￿rms in states where they had a dominant
presence, so that ￿rms in BJP-dominated states are more likely to be classi￿ed
as UNDERSTUDY than as DIV EST. If, additionally, ￿rm value su⁄ers
from being located in a politically disadvantaged state in general, so that ￿rms
in BJP-dominated states were expected to su⁄er after the change in government,
then underperformance of UNDERSTUDY ￿rms relative to DIV EST ￿rms
after the election may be the result of an omitted variable bias. The fact that
our results are una⁄ected by state-level ￿xed e⁄ects implies that this is not a
concern. As an additional test, we construct the variable BJP04s, which is the
fraction of seats in the federal government obtained by the BJP in state s in
the 2004 election, where s is the state that a ￿rm is headquartered; we similarly
de￿ne BJP99s. Consistent with the work of Dinc and Gupta (2005), the mean
value of BJP99 is indeed much higher for NEV ER and UNDERSTUDY
￿rms (0:46 and 0:64), while the average of BJP99 is 0:36 for DIV EST ￿rms.
Collectively, this does support the hypothesis that BJP politicians may have
been avoiding the complete privatization of ￿rms in their home states. We
report results including these political variables in columns (6) and (7) of Table
3. The coe¢ cient on BJP04 is negative and signi￿cant at the one percent level,
but the coe¢ cients on our privatization variables are una⁄ected. Thus, while
there is indeed a signi￿cant e⁄ect of the political a¢ liation of a company￿ s home
state on post-election returns, this is independent of our privatization results.
Additionally, we note that the interaction of BJP04 with our privatization
variables is never signi￿cant, implying that the e⁄ect of ￿rm value of being in a
politically disadvantaged state is substantial also for private ￿rms.6 The results
of these additional analyses lead to our second result:
Result 2 Since the declines in NEV ER and PRIV ATIZED ￿rms are almost
6We view this as a very interesting ancillary set of results, and serves as a contribution
on the value of political connections in the spirit of, for example, Fisman (2001), Ramalho
(2003), and Faccio (2005).
13identical (and close to zero), we infer that there was a greater change in
the probability of privatization for UNDERSTUDY relative to DIV EST
￿rms. We tentatively interpret this as resulting from a limit on the scope
for reversals of policies put in place by the BJP while in power.
3.2 Reaction to the Communist-In￿ uenced Regime (2 day
window)
We take advantage of the ￿ intermediate￿event, as described in Table 1 above,
which suggests that during the two trading days after the election the market
expected a political regime that would be very antagonistic towards economic
reforms due to CPI in￿ uence. In Table 4 we therefore report results parallel
to those in Table 3 above, but for the abbreviated event window of May 14-17.
Interestingly, we ￿nd large and statistically signi￿cant negative coe¢ cients on
both PRIV ATIZED and NEV ER in the two day window. The coe¢ cient on
PRIV ATIZED takes on a value of ￿0:064 in the speci￿cation with full controls,
and is signi￿cant at the one percent level. Assuming once again that there was
no perceived risk of privatization reversal,7 the large and negative coe¢ cient on
PRIV ATIZED suggests that the market anticipated government interventions
in the economy that would di⁄erentially a⁄ect ￿rms with prior government
ownership. This could be the result of the government retaining some means
of controlling these ￿rms, for example, through residual representation on the
board. Alternatively, these companies might be clustered in industries and/or
regions that are particularly amenable to government control.8 Given that
the coe¢ cient on PRIV ATIZED is completely una⁄ected by the inclusion of
industry and state controls, we lean toward the ￿rst explanation.
[Table 4 here]
We similarly ￿nd a large and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient on NEV ER.
In our preferred speci￿cation in column (4) of Table 4 that properly controls
for industry heterogeneity, the point estimate is ￿:0:068 and signi￿cant at the
one percent level. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient is almost identical to the coe¢ -
cient on PRIV ATIZED, suggesting a similar market anticipation of increased
interference in the two types of ￿rms, assuming once again that the probability
of full privatization is zero for NEV ER ￿rms under all economic regimes.9
Finally, we note that in the abbreviated window, we once again ￿nd that
the decline in UNDERSTUDY ￿rms is signi￿cantly greater than that of any
other type of ￿rm, including DIV EST ￿rms. Further, referring once again
to 7, we may once again set A ￿ 0, given the similarity in market response of
7As noted previously, there have been no recent nationalizations (nor any discussion of
potential nationalizations) in India in recent decades.
8For example, the government directed oil companies to freeze retail prices of gasoline in
early 2004.
9Note that this obviously does not imply the same level of interference in the two groups of
￿rms: interference in NEV ER ￿rms is presumably higher than interference PRIV ATIZED
￿rms under any economic regime.
14PRIV ATIZED and NEV ER ￿rms. The implied di⁄erence in the change of
probability of privatization once again suggests that privatizations that had been
put in motion by the BJP, but not yet implemented, would not be undermined
even by this more extreme regime.
Result 3 In the post-election period May 14-17, DIV EST, NEV ER, and
PRIV ATIZED ￿rms experience declines that are signi￿cantly greater
than the declines experienced by private ￿rms; the relative declines of six
to seven percent experienced by these three types of ￿rms are statistically
indistinguishable from one another. UNDERSTUDY ￿rms experienced
even steeper declines of approximately 12 percent relative to private ￿rms.
This decline is signi￿cantly greater than those experienced by all other
types of ￿rms. We interpret these results as implying the following: (1) a
greater fear of interference by a communist-in￿uenced government in both
already privatized and government controlled ￿rms; (2) a greater change in
the probability of privatization of UNDERSTUDY relative to DIV EST,
even under a relatively extreme communist-dominated policy regime.
3.3 Postscript: post-election decisions of the INC
From an asset pricing perspective, the post-election actions of the INC are not
useful in generating a precise measure of market sentiments toward govern-
ment policy, due to the di¢ culty in isolating precise (and surprising) policy
announcements. We can merely make some cursory assessment of whether the
market was correct in its beliefs about privatization reversals. As of this writ-
ing, it is still too early to make a concrete assessment, as virtually none of the
UNDERSTUDY and DIV EST companies has been privatized or slated to
remain under government control. Broadly speaking, the market was indeed
correct about being concerned about shifts in privatization. Soon after the new
government took charge, it scrapped the disinvestment ministry, and announced
the Common Minimum Program which involved much less privatization than
the BJP had planned, though this involved relatively few ￿rms that had been
partially privatized. This will be a potentially useful area for investigation in
a few years￿time.
4 Conclusion
Government policies are subject to reversal following any regime change. In
the volatile politics of many young democracies in the developing world, there is
particular concern that this sort of reversal may reduce credibility with investors
and hamper investment ￿ ows. In this paper, we study the e⁄ects of political
change on privatizations by analyzing market reaction to the INC party￿ s un-
expected victory over the reformist BJP part in the 2004 Indian election. Our
￿ndings provide evidence regarding the presence of limits to which privatization
policy can be reversed. We therefore speak to two important literatures: the
political economy of multi-party democracies, and the process of privatization.
15However, we view this as only a very ￿rst step in generating a broader
understanding of these issues. First, it will be useful to gather further evidence
that may more precisely nail down the irreversibility hypothesis. Further, it
would be useful to know the contexts in which irreversibility is strongest. We
mention at various points in the text the importance of a legislative democracy
with checks and balances, but there is huge variation in governing institutions
within this realm. Research in political economy has examined di⁄erences
stemming from, for example: the extent of electoral competition; presidential
versus parliamentary government; and many others, and it would be useful to
know how these characteristics of government a⁄ect policy inertia.
Additionally, we have uncovered strong e⁄ects of the ruling party on the
valuation of government controlled ￿rms. However, we have not examined the
channels through which this takes place. We suggest that our methodology,
built on examining valuation responses to unexpected electoral outcomes, may
be a useful technique for examining this question in India and elsewhere.
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Table 2A. Freq. Distn of Ownership Type 
 
PRIVATIZED 6   
UNDERSTUDY 14   
DIVEST 11   
NEVER 30   
PRIVATE 432     Table 2B -  Summary Statistics by Firm Type 
Firm Type    Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs        Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs 
All 4 day returns  -0.078  0.053  493  DIVEST 4 day returns  -0.116  0.055  11 
  2 day returns  -0.170  0.077  493    2 day returns  -0.226  0.098  11 
        log(SALES)  6.298  1.433  479 log(SALES)  8.222  1.751  11
                   WAGE_RATE 0.151 0.786 462 WAGE_RATE 0.068 0.080 11
                    Debt/Equity 0.720 35.978 364 Debt/Equity 0.700 16.948 8
                  PBIT/NA 10.473 82.560 429  PBIT/NA 14.285 6.054 10
                  BJP99 0.361  0.296 481 BJP99 0.361 0.336 11
                    BJP04 0.256 0.212 481 BJP04 0.213 0.189 11
                  
PRIVATIZED 4 day returns  -0.086  0.037  6  NEVER 4 day returns  -0.096  0.048  30 
  2 day returns  -0.236  0.053  6    2 day returns  -0.247  0.080  30 
        log(SALES)  8.311  1.115  6 log(SALES)  7.593  1.407  28
                    WAGE_RATE 0.074 0.079 6 WAGE_RATE 0.112 0.062 27
        Debt/Equity  0.135  0.106  2 Debt/Equity 1.235  2.027 6 
        PBIT/NA  17.025  15.182  2 PBIT/NA 1.780  7.719 21 
            BJP99 0.482  0.376  6 BJP99 0.457  0.350  28
            BJP04 0.299  0.333  6 BJP04 0.333  0.252  28
                     
UNDERSTUDY 4 day returns  -0.157  0.052  14           
 2  day returns                 -0.280  0.060  14
              log(SALES)  8.092  1.264  14
              WAGE_RATE  0.132  0.094  14
                Debt/Equity 0.145  1.925  10
                PBIT/NA 19.705  32.936  12
                BJP99 0.643  0.433  14
   BJP04  0.230  0.230  14                
Note: For Debt/Equity and PBIT/NA we list medians rather than means because of the presence of extreme outliers  
Table 3 - Effect of Ownership Type on Four day Post-Election Returns May 14-19 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PRIVATIZED  -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 -0.010 -0.012 
  (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) 
DIVEST -0.043***  -0.038**  -0.037*  -0.035* -0.035*  -0.036**  -0.038** 
  (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
UNDERSTUDY -0.084***  -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.070*** -0.074*** 
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) 
NEVER -0.023**  -0.014  -0.016  -0.017 -0.014 -0.013 -0.015 
  (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
log(Sales)      -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
      (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
WAGE_RATE       -0.014    
       (0.009)    
BJP04        -0.035***  -0.044*** 
        (0.012)  (0.012) 
BJP99         0.020** 
           ( 0 . 0 0 8 )  
Industry  FE  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Observations  493 492 478 470 454 469 469 
R-squared  0.09 0.20 0.21 0.27 0.28 0.23 0.24 
Notes: Four day returns is the dependent variable in all regressions.  PRIVATIZED is an 
indicator variable denoting a fully privatized firm.  NEVER is an indicator variable 
denoting a firm that was not being considered for full privatization at the time of the 
election.  DIVEST is an indicator variable denoting that the firm had been slated for 
disinvestment by the BJP at the time of the election.  UNDERSTUDY is an indicator 
variable denoting that the BJP was studying the possibility of fully privatizing the firm.  
WAGE_RATE is the ratio of the wage bill to sales in 2003.  BJP04 and BJP99 are the 
fractions of seats won by the BJP in the firm's home state in 2004 and 1999 respectively.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
  
Table 4 - Effect of Ownership Type on two day Post-Election Returns May 14-17 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PRIVATIZED -0.076***  -0.075*** -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.059*** -0.060*** 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) 
DIVEST -0.067**  -0.061** -0.057** -0.055* -0.055* -0.055* -0.055* 
  (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.028) 
UNDERSTUDY -0.120***  -0.118*** -0.108*** -0.122*** -0.120*** -0.105*** -0.106*** 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) 
NEVER -0.088***  -0.073*** -0.068*** -0.074*** -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.069*** 
  (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
log(Sales)     -0.006*  -0.006*  -0.007** -0.006** -0.007** 
      (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
WAGE_RATE       -0.018    
       (0.016)    
BJP04         -0.027  -0.031* 
         (0.017)  (0.018) 
BJP99          0.008 
                   (0.013) 
Industry  FE  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State  FE  No  No Yes Yes Yes No  No 
Observations  493 492 478 470 454 469 469 
R-squared  0.16 0.26 0.27 0.32 0.33 0.28 0.28 
Notes: Four day returns is the dependent variable in all regressions.  PRIVATIZED is 
an indicator variable denoting a fully privatized firm.  NEVER is an indicator variable 
denoting a firm that was not being considered for full privatization at the time of the 
election.  DIVEST is an indicator variable denoting that the firm had been slated for 
disinvestment by the BJP at the time of the election.  UNDERSTUDY is an indicator 
variable denoting that the BJP was studying the possibility of fully privatizing the 
firm.  WAGE_RATE is the ratio of the wage bill to sales in 2003.  BJP04 and BJP99 
are the fractions of seats won by the BJP in the firm's home state in 2004 and 1999 
respectively.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 